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COMMENT
THE "VIRTUAL" NETWORK: WHY MILLER V.
CALIFORNIA'S LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARD
SHOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED IN THE WAKE OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT'S KILBRIDE DECISION
Tim K. Boonet
I. INTRODUCTION
"I know it when I see it."' The famous words of Justice Potter Stewart
continue to carry significant meaning in the context of obscenity law. His
position on obscenity aptly described many Supreme Court Justices' views
on the topic in the 1960s and sums up the problems that obscenity law still
encounters today. The Court developed a somewhat vague, but workable,
standard in the landmark 1973 case of Miller v. California.' In Miller, the
Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether material was
obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment.' An important
aspect of this test called for juries to determine whether material was
obscene using a local community standard-that is, juries considered
whether their local community would find particular material obscene. This
standard has been criticized but has withstood that criticism despite facing
numerous court challenges.
With the advent of the Internet in the early 1990s, critics" latched onto a
potential issue the new medium created for Miller's local community
standard: in the context of the Internet, what is the contemporary
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1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3. Id. at 24.
4. General references to widely accepted critical ideas are summarized in the
Introduction but will be examined in detail in the body of the Comment. See, e.g., infra Parts
IV.B.2, 3.
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community? Critics suggest that a local community standard is not viable in
the Internet Age because the Internet is accessible anywhere in the country,
with or without the intention of content providers to target those locations.
Because of the inability of content providers to limit the reach of their
material, critics of the local community standard fear that content providers
will be prosecuted in the least tolerant communities around the country,
even when those providers did not target those communities directly.
According to critics, this leads to a chilling effect on free speech. These
critics claim that the local community standard does not work in the
Internet Age and that a new definition of contemporary community is
needed. Alternatively, many critics suggest that obscenity law needs to be
abandoned entirely.
In Ashcroft v. ACLU,' several Justices expressed concern about the
viability of a local community standard in the Internet Age; two Justices
openly advocated for a national community standard in the Internet
context.' In 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the fractured
opinion in Ashcroft to adopt a national community standard in the Internet
Age.' In early 2010, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
follow the Ninth Circuit's lead.' Thus, a split has emerged among the
circuits as to whether a new community standard is needed in the Internet
Age.
Part II of this Comment provides an in depth summary of the history of
obscenity law. It also details the history of the Internet and what has made it
a technological force for the past twenty years. Part III explores the legal
debate surrounding Miller's local community standard in the Internet
context. Part IV discusses certain proposed solutions to the local
community standard, especially relating to the adoption of a national
community standard. Additionally, Part IV proposes that the local
community standard should remain intact because a national standard
creates only the illusion of a problem-solving standard while in reality
creating problems of its own. Part V concludes the discussion, summarizing
the potential problems with replacing the local community standard with a
national community standard and, ultimately, arguing that the local
community standard-and obscenity law in general-should remain intact.
5. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 589. Justices O'Connor and Breyer penned concurring opinions openly
advocating for a national standard.
7. See United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
8. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Road to Miller
1. The Common Law Rule
The common law rule for obscenity originated in the 1868 English case
of Regina v. Hicklin.' The Hicklin test for obscenity was "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall.""o The test focused on preventing the
weaker members of society from giving in to their own base impulses.
American courts soon adopted the Hicklin test as the common law test for
obscenity in the United States."
Despite eighty years of prominence, the Hicklin test did not escape
criticism from American judges. In United States v. Kennerley,12 the famous
American jurist, Judge Learned Hand, played an important role in the
development of the modern obscenity test. Although Judge Hand ultimately
applied the Hicklin test, he concluded his opinion with a concise summary
of the common law test's weaknesses. He first acknowledged the antiquated
nature of the Hicklin test for obscenity, stating that the test was
"consonant ... with mid-Victorian morals."" Judge Hand further explained
that the common law rule deferred to the most prudish members of society
as opposed to the average members of society by stating:
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which
is honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince
its words, still I scarcely think they would forbid all which might
corrupt the most corruptible, or that society is prepared to accept
for its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary to
the weakest of its members."
Judge Hand went on to state that what is obscene should not be determined
by reference to an abstract definition but to the moral place at which the
9. Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360 (Eng.).
10. Id. at 371.
11. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (noting that some American
courts adopted the Hicklin standard).
12. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
13. Id. at 120.
14. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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community had arrived." Expanding upon that proposition, he stated that
juries should decide whether material is obscene in accordance with a
reasonable person standard similar to the standard employed in negligence
cases.' 6 He concluded his opinion with a statement foreshadowing the
modern test that would eventually be adopted: "To put thought in leash to
the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the
necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy.""
Whereas Judge Hand merely criticized the common law rule, it would
take another New York judge to depart from it. In United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," Judge Woolsey sought to apply the more objective
standard Judge Hand had suggested. He stated, "I must endeavor to apply a
more objective standard to his [James Joyce's] book in order to determine
its effect in the result, irrespective of the intent with which it was written."
He then established a new test: "Whether a particular book would tend to
excite such impulses and thoughts must be tested by the court's opinion as
to its effect on a person with average sex instincts...."2 0 Although Judge
Woolsey departed from the Hicklin test, his test did not replace the
common law rule at the national level.
2. From Roth to Jacobellis
In 1957, the Supreme Court issued what was at the time a landmark
decision relating to obscenity law. In Roth v. United States,21 the Court
finally adopted an objective test for state and federal courts to apply in
obscenity cases. First, the Court held that obscenity was not speech
protected under the First Amendment.2 2 Second, the Court held that sex
and obscenity were not synonymous and that "obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."" Last, the
Court proceeded to reject the Hicklin test and adopt a new test for
obscenity: "[Wihether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
19. Id. at 184.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22. Id. at 485.
23. Id. at 487.
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appeals to prurient interest."24 The Court's stated rationale for adopting the
new test was to bring objectivity to obscenity prosecutions. Echoing Judge
Learned Hand's statements in Kennerley, the Court said
[tihe test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual
impure thoughts in those comprising a particular segment of the
community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish or
would leave another segment, the scientific or highly educated or
the so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and
unmoved.25
Following Roth, the Court continued to modify and to struggle with the
test it had formulated. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,26 the Court refined the
Roth test and developed it into a three-part test:
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three
elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value.27
As the Supreme Court later noted in Miller v. California,28 the key change in
the Memoirs formulation of the obscenity test involved the burden of proof.
The Roth test presumed that obscene material was "utterly without
redeeming social importance," whereas the Memoirs test required the
prosecution to affirmatively establish that obscene material was "utterly
without redeeming social value."29 Chief Justice Burger stated in Miller that
24. Id. at 489.
25. Id.
26. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). The full name of
the party "Memoirs" was "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," commonly known as "Fanny
Hill," which John Cleland wrote around 1750. Id. at 415. Interestingly, the book itself was put
on trial and not its publisher or distributor. This odd procedural aspect of the case had its
origin in a Massachusetts statute that required the suit to be brought against the book by
name, as opposed to the publisher or distributor of the book. Id.
27. Id. at 418.
28. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
29. Id. at 21-22.
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the Memoirs reformulation essentially required the prosecution to prove a
negative.30
After Memoirs, the Supreme Court decided Jacobellis v. Ohio.3 1 The
Court's opinion in Jacobellis is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Court
affirmed that the "contemporary community standards" element of the
Roth test's second prong was to be determined on the basis of a national
standard.32 The Court stated that "the constitutional status of an allegedly
obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national standard. It is,
after all, a national Constitution we are expounding."33 This particular
holding of the Court was eventually challenged and rejected in Miller v.
California.3 ' The other noteworthy aspect of the Jacobellis decision was on a
more humorous note. In his concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart famously
stated "[blut I know it [obscenity] when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that."3 1 In many ways, Justice Potter Stewart's
statement exemplified the Supreme Court's approach to obscenity in the
years between Roth and Miller. As Chief Justice Burger later emphasized in
Miller, apart from Roth, no majority at any time had been able to agree on a
standard to determine what constituted obscene material.36
Finally, two later cases provided further insight into the Court's
approach to issues involving obscenity before Miller. In Stanley v. Georgia,"
the Court held that the government could not make it unlawful for an
individual to possess obscene materials in the privacy of his own home.38
30. Id. at 22.
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (plurality opinion). Like many of the 1960s
obscenity cases, Jacobellis was a fractured opinion. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality
opinion in which Justice Goldberg joined. Id. at 185. Justice Black wrote a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Douglas. Id. at 196. Justices White, Stewart, and Goldberg each
wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 196-98. Chief Justice Warren wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Clark. Id. at 199. Justice Harlan wrote his own dissent. Id. at 203.
32. Id. at 195.
33. Id.
34. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
35. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22. "[N]o majority of the Court has at any given time been able to
agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to
regulation under the States' police power." Id.
37. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
38. Id. at 565. In Stanley, the appellant was charged with possession of obscene matter.
Id. at 558. Federal and state agents found Stanley's obscene matter (three reels of eight-
millimeter film) accidentally. Id. The agents originally obtained a search warrant to
[ Vol. 6:347352
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The Court would later clarify Stanley in United States v. Orito,3 9 holding
that while an individual has a right to possess obscene material, he does not
have a correlative right to receive, transport, or distribute it.40
B. The Miller Test
In 1973, the Supreme Court outlined a new test for obscenity in Miller v.
California." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that Miller
was "one of a group of 'obscenity-pornography' cases" that the Court was
reviewing and involved "what Mr. Justice Harlan called 'the intractable
obscenity problem."'4 2 He then reaffirmed that obscene material was
unprotected by the First Amendment. Noting that state statutes regulating
obscene material must be carefully limited, the Court outlined the
boundaries of obscenity by limiting it to works "which depict or describe
sexual conduct."" With this foundation, the Court proceeded to expound a
new three-pronged test for obscenity to replace those tests articulated in
Roth and Memoirs:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."
investigate Stanley's home for evidence of bookmaking activities. Id. They found little
evidence of bookmaking activity, but while looking through one of Stanley's drawers in an
upstairs bedroom, the agents came across the three reels of eight-millimeter film that led to
his conviction. Id.
39. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
40. Id. at 143. In Orito, Orito was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 14621 for knowingly
transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce. Id. at 140. The materials involved
close to eighty-three reams of film. Id. Orito moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the statute violated the First and Ninth Amendments. Id. The district court agreed with
Orito and held that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
41. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 23.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id.
20121 353
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In the context of this new test, the Court gave examples of what state
statutes could define as obscene under part (b) of the test. The Court stated
that material could be found patently offensive if it contained "offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated" and "patently offensive representations or depictions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals."'
With this standard, the Court knew that juries might reach different
conclusions as to the same material but noted that such a disparity did not
abridge constitutional rights."
The Court next addressed how to define the phrase "contemporary
community standards." The Court stated there did not need to be "uniform
national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is
'patently offensive.""' Thus, the Court adopted a definition of the
contemporary community that was to be based on a local standard rather
than a national one.49 Earlier in the opinion, the Court had stated that the
scope of the local community could encompass a region as large as a state.so
C. The Refinement of Miller
The Supreme Court decisions following Miller further clarified the new
test. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton," the Court held that expert evidence
of whether material is obscene was allowed when the materials themselves
were not placed into evidence.52 In Hamling v. United States, the Court
further expounded upon Miller's contemporary community standard." The
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 26 n.9.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 37.
50. Id. at 33-34 (holding that it was not unconstitutional to allow the jury to evaluate
materials with reference to the contemporary community standards of the State of
California).
51. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1974). In Paris, the petitioners, two
Atlanta, Georgia movie theaters and their owners and managers, were operating adult
theaters. Id. at 50-51. The local state district attorney alleged that two films petitioners were
exhibiting-"Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in the End"-were obscene. Id. at 51-52.
The meanings of these two titles are beyond the scope of this article.
52. Id. at 56.
53. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). It could be argued that the petitioners
in Hamling wanted to be convicted of mailing obscenity. William L. Hamling was just one of
a number of petitioners, along with Reed Enterprises, Inc. and Library Services, Inc., that
conspired to mail and advertise "The Illustrated and Presidential Report of the Commission
[Vol. 6:347354
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Court stated that a juror might rely on his own knowledge of the average
person in the community just as he might rely on the knowledge of a
reasonable person in other areas of the law.' Miller's emphasis on
contemporary community standards, however, raised questions about jury
discretion.
In two separate decisions, the Supreme Court finally addressed jury
discretion in obscenity prosecutions. First, in Jenkins v. Georgia," the Court
conceded that although the prurient interest and patent offensiveness
prongs of the Miller test were questions of fact for the jury, juries did not
have unbridled discretion to determine what was patently offensive."6 In
Smith v. United States," the Court further added that while contemporary
community standards must be applied in accordance with the tolerance of
the average person in the community, it did not mean that obscenity
convictions would be unreviewable." Consequently, juries were to apply
contemporary community standards in determining whether material was
obscene, but courts had the power to review those decisions. Smith is also
noteworthy because the Supreme Court explicitly clarified that the second
prong of the Miller test-patent offensiveness-was also to be applied using
a contemporary community standard.59
on Obscenity and Pornography." Id. at 91. The advertisement that was found obscene was a
single-sheet brochure that gave information as to where, how, and from whom the
"Illustrated Report" could be obtained. Id. The advertisement was mailed to approximately
55,000 persons around the United States. Id. at 92. The petitioners were convicted after a jury
trial, and on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at
91-92. If Mr. Hamling and his fellow conspirators intended to be convicted, they were
successful.
54. Id. at 104-05.
55. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). Jenkins involved a notable 1970s film,
"Carnal Knowledge," which starred several notable, early-1970s actors: Jack Nicholson, Art
Garfunkel, Ann-Margaret, and Candice Bergen. Id. at 154, 158-59.
56. Id. at 160.
57. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). In Smith, two postal inspectors using
fictitious names requested that the petitioner, Smith, mail to them various allegedly obscene
materials consisting of magazines and films. Id. at 293. Smith then mailed the materials from
Des Moines, Iowa, to post office box addresses in Mount Ayr and Guthrie Center in
southern Iowa. Id.
58. Id. at 305.
59. Id. at 301("The Miller opinion indicates that patent offensiveness is to be treated in
the same way [as prurient interest].... [Tihe jury must measure patent offensiveness against
contemporary community standards.").
2012] 355
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Following the Smith decision, one question remained: if the first and
second prongs of Miller are to be applied using a contemporary community
standard, what standard applies to the third prong? The Court addressed
this question in Pope v. Illinois.' In Pope, the Court explicitly addressed
what community standard was appropriate to determine whether allegedly
obscene material contained any serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." The Court held that the third prong was not to be
measured against an "ordinary member of [a] given community," but
instead by whether a reasonable person would find value in the allegedly
obscene material.62 After Pope, it seemed that the final questions regarding
the Miller test were answered. Miller's contemporary community standard,
however, soon came under attack with the advent of the Internet.
D. A Brief Background of the Internet
When addressing the issue of determining contemporary community
standards in the Internet Age, it is advantageous to look into events
surrounding the Internet's inception and why it raises unique issues for the
Miller test. The Internet originated as a project within the Department of
Defense in the 1960s.63 It started out small-a mere 500 host computers in
1983.' In 2000, there were 360 million Internet users. By 2009, there were
1.7 billion Internet users worldwide, approximately twenty-five percent of
the world's population.6' Richard Spinello has called this "global
connectivity" of the Internet its "most attractive feature" because it brings
together millions of people, as well as thousands of organizations, all over
60. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). In Pope, police detectives purchased magazines
from the two petitioners who were attendants at adult bookstores. Id. at 499. The petitioners
were then separately charged with the offense of obscenity for the sale of the magazines
under the then-current version of Illinois' obscenity statute. Id. The petitioners argued that
the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to require that the value question (Miller's
third-prong) be judged "solely on an objective basis as opposed to reference [sic] to
contemporary community standards." Id. Both the trial court and the appeals court rejected
that contention, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 499-500.
61. Id. at 500-01.
62. Id.
63. RICHARD A. SPINELLO, CYBERETHICS: MORALITY AND LAW IN CYBERSPACE 29 (4th ed.
2011).
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id.
[Vol. 6:347356
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the world." This achievement led The Economist to state that the Internet
brought the "death of distance."
The surge in the Internet's popularity is attributed to the World Wide
Web ("Web"), which is a collection of multimedia documents that are
accessed through the Internet." According to the Internet Systems
Consortium, 9 there were close to 625 million active domain Web sites
operating on the Web in 2009.70 The Internet's popularity has led to
numerous social problems in cyberspace, such as the erosion of privacy and
the emergence of perverted forms of speech." With 625 million operating
domains, it is easy to see how potentially obscene material could be accessed
anywhere across the nation, thus subjecting the owners of those domains to
obscenity prosecutions. The Internet's rapid growth and national character
have created new challenges for courts that seek to apply Miller's
contemporary community standard. Courts have struggled with the
question of whether the Internet is truly a unique national medium that
requires a new standard or, instead, whether it should be treated similar to
other broadcast mediums.
III. THE ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
STANDARDS IN THE INTERNET AGE
The road that led to the current debate about Miller's local community
standard began in the late 1980s with Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC.72 Some early cases dealing with the Internet attempted to
transfer the arguments from Sable to the Internet. These early challenges to
the local community standard all failed. Nevertheless, in Ashcroft v. ACLU,"
the Court breathed new life into those who opposed the application of a
local community standard to a national medium like the Internet. The
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 33.
69. On its website, The Internet Systems Consortium describes itself as "a non-profit
501(c)(3) public benefit corporation dedicated to supporting the infrastructure of the
universal connected self-organizing Internet-and the autonomy of its participants-by
developing and maintaining core production quality software, protocols, and operations."
INTERNET SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM, http://www.isc.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
70. SPINELLO, supra note 63, at 34.
71. See id. at 40.
72. Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
73. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (plurality opinion).
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aftermath of Ashcroft gave the Ninth Circuit the impetus to adopt a national
community standard.
A. Early Cases Dealing With the Internet
1. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC
Sable Communications of California was notable for involving a medium
analogous to the Internet: the telephone network.4 In Sable, the defendant,
Sable Communications of California, Inc. ("Sable"), was a Los Angeles-
based affiliate of a company that offered sexually oriented telephone
messages, known as "dial-a-porn."" Callers outside the Los Angeles area
were able to reach the phone service via a long-distance toll call;"6 thus, like
the Internet, users could access Sable's services from anywhere in the
country. Sable filed a suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment
that an amended obscenity provision to the Communication Act of 1934
was unconstitutional.n Sable argued that the provision compelled it to tailor
its messages to the least tolerant members of the community. The Court
held that Congress's prohibition of the interstate transmission of obscene
commercial telephone recordings was not unconstitutional.7 9 The Court
reiterated its precedents that subjecting distributors of allegedly obscene
material to varying community standards did not render a federal statute
unconstitutional because it failed to apply uniform national standards."o
The Court went on to hold that Miller's contemporary community standard
test was not unconstitutional even though materials may be found obscene
in one community but not another." Thus, the Court held that Sable bore
the burden of complying with different communities' prohibitions of
obscene materials. 82
74. Sable, 492 U.S. at 115.
75. Id. at 118.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 124.
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 125-26.
82. Id. at 126.
358 [Vol. 6:347
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2. United States v. Thomas
Although Sable concerned a medium analogous to the Internet, United
States v. Thomas was one of the first obscenity cases involving the new
Internet medium.83 In Thomas, the defendants operated an online message
board from their home in California.' Using the message board, individuals
could access, transfer, and download sexually-explicit, Graphical
Interchange Format ("GIF")" files onto their computers.8 Notably, access
to the GIF files was limited to people who were paying members." An
individual who resided in Tennessee filed a complaint with a United States
Postal Inspector.88 Following an investigation, charges were filed against the
defendants in the Western District of Tennessee."
The defendants asserted that Miller's contemporary community standard
prong did not apply.90 The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the
GIF files were transferred from defendants' home to Tennessee.91 Therefore,
the court held that in cases involving the Internet, prosecutions could be
brought either in the district where obscene materials were dispatched or in
the district of receipt and that the local community standards prong
applied.92
The court also addressed the defendants' and Amicus Curiae's argument
that the Internet required a new definition of community, one based on
cyberspace rather than geographic location." The court, however, rejected
83. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 705.
85. What is the GIF graphics file format?, INDIANA UNIVERSITY'S KNOWLEDGE BASE,
http://kb.iu.edu/data/aovp.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
The Graphical Interchange Format (GIF) is one of the most widely used image
formats on the web. GIF files are recognizable by their .gif file extension. GIF
is suitable for images with sharp edges and relatively few gradations of color,
such as line art, cartoons, and text. You can also create background
transparencies and animations using GIF images.
Id.
86. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 711.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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this argument, reasoning that the present case was not a situation in which
the defendant had no knowledge or control over where the obscene
materials would be downloaded." Access was limited to the defendants'
message board, and members were screened and issued passwords before
materials were distributed." Thus, the court reasoned that the defendants
had the power to preclude liability in less tolerant communities. 6
Ultimately, the court determined that there was no need to adopt a new
definition of "community" in cases involving Internet message boards."
B. The Strange Case of Ashcroft v. ACLU
In 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a fractured decision in Ashcroft v.
ACLU that cast doubt about the viability of a local community standard in
Internet obscenity cases." In Ashcroft, the ACLU and several Internet
websites challenged the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act
of 1998 (COPA). 99 The Child Online Protection Act was Congress's second
attempt at protecting children from Internet pornography. 00 The
respondents challenged COPA § 231(e)(6)(A), which defined "material
harmful to minors" with reference to the test outline in Miller.'o' That
provision stated that obscene material was to be measured by whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest[.]" 0 2
Respondents claimed that COPA's use of contemporary community
standards would render some of their website content harmful to minors in
some communities, but not in others.03 The Third Circuit agreed with the
respondents, holding that the Court's prior community standards
jurisprudence had no applicability to the Internet because Web publishers
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 712.
98. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 566; see generally Child Online Protection Act of 1998, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
100. COPA's predecessor, the Communications Decency Act of 1996, had been declared
unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997).
101. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 570.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 571.
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did not have the ability to control the geographic scope of their
communications. 10
1. Justice Thomas's Plurality
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
wrote the plurality opinion of the Court"os and affirmed Miller's definition
of community standards in Internet cases." Justice Thomas rejected the
respondents' argument that the unique characteristics of the Internet
required that the Court adopt a different approach to community standards
in Internet cases.' 7 Justice Thomas reiterated that community standards did
not need to be defined with reference to a specific geographic area' and
that a different standard-the adult population as a whole-would not solve
the variance in community standards that the respondents feared."9
Furthermore, Justice Thomas was of the opinion that any danger resulting
from the variances the local community standard posed was limited by
Miller's "value prong.""o Justice Thomas, therefore, relied on the holdings
in Hamling and Sable to reiterate that if a publisher chose to send its
material into a particular community, it was the publisher's responsibility to
abide by that community's standards."' Thus, just as in Sable, an Internet
content provider's burden in preventing obscene materials from reaching
particular communities did not change because it chose to distribute its
materials to every community in the United States."2
2. Justice O'Connor Advocates for A National Standard
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she openly
advocated for the adoption of a national community standard in Internet
obscenity cases."' She noted, "[T]he use of local community standards will
104. Id. at 575.
105. Id. at 566.
106. See id. at 583.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 576.
109. See id. at 577.
110. See id. at 579.
111. Id. at 583.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I
write separately to express my views on the constitutionality and desirability of adopting a
national standard for obscenity for regulation of the Internet.").
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cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the Internet, for adults as well
as children, in future cases."" She further stated that expecting Internet
publishers to bear the burden of controlling the recipients of their speech, as
in Hamling and Sable, would be "entirely too much to ask" and "would
potentially suppress an inordinate amount of expression.""' For these
reasons, she felt it was necessary to adopt a national standard "for any
reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity.""'
Justice O'Connor then explained why a national standard was not
incompatible with the Court's prior obscenity jurisprudence. She noted that
Supreme Court precedent and the First Amendment did not prohibit
adoption of a national standard and that the Court in the Jenkins and Miller
decisions did not mandate adoption of local community standards."'
Also, Justice O'Connor was not concerned about potential difficulties
with a national standard. She noted that the Court in Miller allowed local
community standards to be applied to the State of California, a large and
diverse state containing thirty-three million people."' Thus, she did not
think that generalizations about the national community of the United
States would pose a problem, considering the Court felt jurors were capable
of making generalizations about the State of California." 9 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor believed that a national standard was not only constitutional in
Internet cases but also reasonable.120
3. Justice Breyer Advocates for A National Standard
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor in advocating for a national standard in Internet obscenity cases.
Justice Breyer wrote separately because he believed that Congress, in
drafting COPA, intended the word "community" in "contemporary
community standards" to refer to the "[n]ation's adult community taken as
a whole, not to geographically separate local areas."' 2' Therefore, Justice
114. Id. at 587.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 587-88.
118. Id. at 588-89.
119. Id. at 589.
120. Id.
121. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Breyer was of the opinion that Congress envisioned COPA to incorporate a
national adult standard, not a community standard.'2 2
Justice Breyer opined that adopting a local community standard in the
context of the Internet would raise First Amendment issues.'23 He therefore
stated that adopting a local community standard "would provide the most
puritan of communities with a heckler's Internet veto affecting the rest of
the [n]ation" and that the "technical difficulties associated with efforts to
confine Internet material to particular geographic areas make the problem
particularly serious."' 4 He then asserted his opinion that a "nationally
uniform adult-based standard" would therefore alleviate "any special need
for First Amendment protection."125
4. Justice Kennedy's Plurality
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg
and Souter joined.'26 Justice Kennedy expressed his view that the Internet
created difficulties for the community standards criterion, meaning that
"any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by
the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the
message."l27 He therefore believed that the Internet was a medium that
posed difficulties for the community standards criterion in a way the
mediums in Hamling and Sable did not.' Justice Kennedy was of the
opinion that "national variation in community standards [constituted] a
particular burden on Internet speech."l2 9 Therefore, Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion expressed doubts about the viability of a local
community standard in Internet obscenity cases but did not expressly reject
such a standard or adopt a different standard.'
122. Id. at 590.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 591.
126. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-88 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 597.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 602.
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5. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which he opined that Miller's
contemporary community standard criterion did not work in the Internet
context."' He stated that the Miller test was meant to be a shield to protect
offensive communications from the least tolerant members of society.'32 In
the context of the Internet, he believed that community standards became a
"sword, rather than a shield" and that " [i] f a prurient appeal is offensive in a
puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web.""
Justice Stevens believed that because of the unique nature of the Internet,
where information is accessible everywhere to anyone online, Internet
publishers could not "control access based on the location of the listener,
nor [could they] choose the pathways through which [their] speech is
transmitted."l34
Although Justice Stevens found difficulties with applying a local
community standard to the Internet, he did not necessarily believe a
national standard was the solution. He stated that even jurors applying a
"national, or adult, standard" would reach "widely different conclusions
throughout the country."'3
Justice Stevens did opine, however, that the Internet needed a different
standard. He reiterated his view that the Miller test acted not only as a
shield to protect potentially offensive communications but also as a shield
to protect audience members because it allowed people to "self-sort" in
different communities "based on their preferences."'36 He believed that this
"sorting mechanism" did not exist in cyberspace and that, as a result,
audience members could not "self-segregate." 37
The Ashcroft v. ACLU decision created uncertainty about the future of
the local community standard in Internet obscenity cases. Only three
Justices firmly adhered to the local community standard approach while
two advocated for a national standard; three Justices had doubts about the
viability of the local community standard approach in Internet cases and
one opined that a local or national community standard would present
131. See id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 603.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Id. at 607 n.3.
136. Id. at 612.
137. Id.
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significant issues.' Consequently, Ashcroft's fractured opinion left open the
door for a new standard in Internet obscenity cases.
C. The Circuit Courts' Post-Ashcroft Maneuvering
1. The Ninth Circuit Shakes It Up: United States v. Kilbride
The Ashcroft decision gave new latitude to the circuit courts in Internet
obscenity cases. In United States v. Kilbride,'" the Ninth Circuit took
advantage of Ashcroft's fractured opinion to adopt a national community
standard in Internet obscenity cases.140 In Kilbride, the defendants
challenged the instruction to the jury concerning "contemporary
community standards," arguing that the jury should have been instructed to
apply a national community standard."'
The court examined the Supreme Court's precedents in light of the
contemporary community standard in the Ashcroft v. ACLU decision. The
court noted that Ashcroft was a plurality decision: Justice Thomas and two
other Justices upheld local community standards'4 2 whereas Justices
O'Connor and Breyer both advocated for a national community standard in
Internet cases."' The Ninth Circuit was of the opinion that Justices
O'Connor's and Breyer's opinions agreed with a limited aspect of Justice
Thomas's holding that "variance inherent in application of a national
community standard would likely not pose constitutional concerns by
itself."'" The court finally noted that the five concurring Justices did not
view the application of a national community standard as problematic."'
Relying on this Supreme Court precedent,'" the Ninth Circuit held that a
national community standard must be applied in regulating speech on the
138. See supra Part III.B.
139. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
140. Id. at 1250.
141. Id. at 1247.
142. Id. at 1252.
143. Id. at 1253.
144. Id. at 1254.
145. Id.
146. The court held that, in the case of a fragmented court, "'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds.'" Id. (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Internet because Justices O'Connor's and Breyer's holdings had rested on
the narrowest grounds.'
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Traditional Approach
With the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a national community standard, the
question arose whether other circuits would follow. The answer came in the
form of a firm negative several months later in United States v. Little.' In
Little, the appellants had produced and sold videos of a sexually explicit
nature that were marketed online at their sexually explicit website 49 As in
Kilbride, the appellants asserted that a national or Internet community
standard should apply in Internet obscenity cases.so The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this argument' and affirmed that Miller's contemporary
community standard remained the test for defining obscenity on the
Internet.' In reaching this decision, the court acknowledged that the Ninth
Circuit had adopted a national community standard in Kilbride'" but that
the portions of the Ashcroft opinion on which the Ninth Circuit relied were
dicta and not the ruling of the Supreme Court.'" Therefore, the court held
that Miller's contemporary community standard should still be applied in
Internet obscenity cases.'
D. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is cited as a chief reason behind the need to adopt a
national community standard in Internet obscenity cases. Forum shopping
in the obscenity context has been defined as "prosecutors . . . bringing
charges only in conservative communities, where they have a greater chance
of empanelling a jury that will judge sexually oriented materials obscene."'56
147. Id.
148. United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. 2009).
149. Id. at 161.
150. Id. at 163-64.
151. Id. at 164.
152. Id. at 162.
153. Id. at 164.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The
Ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards
in Cyberspace, 89 NEB. L. REV. 47, 56 (2010) (quoting Robert F. Howe, U.S. Accused of
'Censorship by Intimidation' in Pornography Cases,WASH. PosT, Mar. 26, 1990, at A4).
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The argument is straightforward: because the Internet can be accessed
almost anywhere in the country, a local community standard allows
prosecutors to bring Internet obscenity prosecutions wherever they please,
often in the least tolerant communities in the nation.' Some support does
exist for this argument, as it appears that prosecutors are willing to bring
obscenity prosecutions in less tolerant communities than where the
materials are produced.'
Indeed, the number of obscenity prosecutions reached its zenith in the
1980s and early 1990s.' 9 During that period, the federal government openly
admitted to a strategy of forum shopping simultaneously in multiple
venues.' In a letter to then-United States Attorney General Edwin Meese
in 1985, Brent Ward, the United States Attorney for Utah, outlined the
forum shopping strategy:
The heart of this strategy calls for multiple prosecutions (either
simultaneous or successive) at all levels of government in many
locations. If thirty-five prosecutors comprise the strike force,
theoretically thirty-five different criminal prosecutions could be
instigated simultaneously against one or more of the major
pornographers .... I believe that such a strategy would deal a
serious blow to the pornography industry . . . . This strategy
would test the limits of pornographers' endurance. I believe the
targeted companies would curtail their operations and withdraw
from and refrain from entering geographical markets in which
they could not find community acceptance.161
157. See id. at 56-61.
158. Alyson Wall, Prosecutors Seek Conservative Venues for Porn Trials, PI7r. TRIB. REV.,
May 18, 2004, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s-194571.html
(discussing federal prosecutors' tendency to prosecute obscenity cases in more conservative
communities, such as Pittsburgh, as opposed to Hollywood, California).
159. During this period federal prosecutors successfully put seven of the nation's largest
pornography distributors out of business. Jason Krause, The End of the Net Porn Wars,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
theend of the_netpornwars/; see also Linda P. Campbell, Federal Unit Aims at
Pornographers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1990, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-
04-06/news/9001280255_1_justice-department-pornographers-prosecutors (asserting that
by April 1990 federal prosecutors had "piled up convictions in 15 states, including Illinois,
with fines totaling more than $3 million").
160. United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1992).
161. Id.
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Mr. Ward's comments show that, at least in the 1980s, federal prosecutors
underwent a coordinated effort to shop for the most favorable fora around
the country to obtain obscenity convictions.6 ' As an example of the success
of this strategy, the federal government used forum shopping in 1991 to
target "a shipment of sexually explicit videotapes from a California
company to a Dallas distributor who was cooperating with a police
department vice squad investigation."' 6' Forum shopping was a legitimate
concern in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The zealous pursuit of obscenity convictions has declined in recent years
as American society has become more accepting of pornography and as
prosecutors have sought to allocate their resources toward what they
perceive as more pressing matters, such as child pornography. For example,
in 2003, there were eighty-three obscenity prosecutions in the nation
compared to 3,294 for child pornography and 1,795 for terrorism." In
contrast, during the 1980s and early 1990s, federal prosecutors successfully
put seven of the nation's largest pornography distributors out of business. 6 s
Federal prosecutors' lackluster desire to prosecute obscenity cases is largely
responsible for the decline.'" Many prosecutors perceive obscenity
prosecutions as a waste of resources-resources they believe should be
directed toward more pervasive evils.'6 7 For example, Clyde DeWitt, a
defense attorney for adult entertainment producers and retailers, has stated:
"If you talk to prosecutors on the front lines, they've got fraud, gang
activity, organized crime[,] and drug cartels to contend with. Nobody wants
resources redirected to dirty movies . . . . Whoever gets that assignment is
the laughingstock of the department."'6  Even organizations that once
162. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 56-57 ("The federal government aggressively used
forum shopping-in fact, it employed simultaneous, multiple-venue forum shopping-
during its 'Project PostPorn' prosecutions against adult movie producers in the late 1980s
and early 1990s." (footnote omitted)).
163. Id. at 59 (quoting Dianna Hunt, Dallas Obscenity Case May Cost Porno Supplier,
Hous. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1991, at 6A).
164. See Wall, supra note 158.
165. See Krause, supra note 159.
166. Id.
167. In 2005, for example, Alex Acosta, interim United States Attorney for the Southern
District of Florida, assigned members of his staff to pornography cases. Id. In response,
many members of his staff complained to the Associated Press, stating "they were 'stunned'
that resources were being used for obscenity cases." Id.
168. Id. Mr. DeWitt seldom defends obscenity cases for his clients these days due to the
decline in obscenity prosecutions. He stated:
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focused on combating all obscenity have turned their sights elsewhere. The
National Law Center for Children and Families was once focused on
combating all obscenity.'69 Presently, the National Law Center for Children
and Families helps train Department of Justice lawyers in how to investigate
and prosecute child pornography and human trafficking cases but does not
do anything with adult obscenity cases.o70 During the Bush administration,
obscenity prosecutions did not increase at the rate free speech advocates
feared, despite stirring anti-pornography speeches by Attorney General
John Ashcroft and his successor Alberto Gonzales. 7 1
E. The "Chilling" of Free Speech
Forum shopping is intertwined with the other great fear of anti-obscenity
law proponents: the chilling effects a local community standard has on free
speech. The late Justice William Brennan adequately summed up the local
community standard's chilling effect on free speech in his 1974 dissent in
Hamling v. United States:
National distributors choosing to send their products in
interstate travels will be forced to cope with the community
standards of every hamlet into which their goods may wander.
Because these variegated standards are impossible to discern,
national distributors, fearful of risking the expense and difficulty
of defending against prosecution in any of several remote
communities, must inevitably be led to retreat to debilitating
self-censorship that abridges the First Amendment rights of the
people.172
I now spend an ungodly amount of time prosecuting copyright infringement-
content that's stolen from my clients-but not doing obscenity work ... .There
haven't been enough prosecutions to know, but I have to believe attitudes have
changed in the last 15 years so that it would be harder to get a conviction.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Neil A. Lewis, A Prosecution Tests the Definition of Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/us/28obscene.html. In actuality, by
late 2007 there had been fewer than two-dozen federal obscenity prosecutions that did not
also contain charges of child pornography, an offense that is prosecuted much more
frequently. Id.
172. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In other words, under a local community standard, Justice Brennan feared
that content providers would be unable to discern what material would be
classified as obscene in one part of the country but not in another.
Consequently, content providers would be forced to self-censor themselves
to avoid obscenity prosecutions in the least tolerant communities in the
nation.
Justice Brennan's argument arguably had less force in 1974 than it does
today. In the 1970s, content providers had control over where they
distributed pornographic materials. If Playboy did not want to send
pornographic materials to rural Kansas, it did not have to send them there.
The Internet has changed this dynamic. Now, as the argument goes,
Playboy has no control over the geographic locations from which an
individual can access its website. Therefore, a content provider such as
Playboy needs to be cautious about the material it posts on its website,
perhaps even resorting to a diluted message than would otherwise be posted
if obscenity law did not exist.
IV. WHY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARD SHOULD REMAIN INTACT
A. Does the Need for a New Standard Truly Exist?
Those who oppose obscenity law do so for two reasons: (1) prosecutors'
tendencies to forum shop"' and (2) its chilling effects on free speech."'
Many who oppose obscenity law say it should be abandoned entirely. Other
opponents argue that to avoid the negative ramifications of the local
community standard in the Internet Age, some form of a national standard
should be adopted."' Nevertheless, whether the need for a national
standard truly exists is questionable. It is also questionable whether a
national standard would stop the forum shopping and the chilling effects on
free speech attributed to the local community standard. Those who support
obscenity law believe there is no need to adopt a new community standard
173. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 55-61 (providing a thorough analysis of forum
shopping in the 1980s and early 1990s); see also supra Part III.D.
174. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra Part III.E.
175. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 52 (discussing a previous national standard he
proposed); Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity Law as an Alternative
to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 70 (2004) (proposing a
minimal-or most permissive community-national standard).
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in the Internet Age.1 6 Those who oppose obscenity law believe that the local
community standard poses a problem that needs to be fixed. In this author's
view, the "problem" that anti-obscenity advocates have with obscenity law is
not a problem at all. In fact, the changes offered by anti-obscenity advocates
create further problems of their own. As a result, obscenity law should be
preserved, and there is no need to change the community standard because
it guards against many of the concerns expressed by anti-obscenity
advocates.
B. Possible Changes to the Local Community Standard Approach
1. Abandon Obscenity Law
The simplest change to the issue of local community standards is to
abandon obscenity law in its entirety. Numerous scholars have advanced
this position, claiming that self-regulation is a more effective-and less
problematic-means of handling obscenity."' Although some Justices on
the Supreme Court have expressed doubts about the viability of the local
community standard in the Internet Age, none has expressed doubts about
the viability of obscenity law itself."'
Still, if the Supreme Court declared obscene speech to be protected
speech under the First Amendment, the ramifications would be far-
reaching. Content once considered taboo' by a majority of porn producers
would become rampant. In a post-obscenity world, it would certainly be
interesting to see if porn producers would engage in the kind of self-
regulation that anti-obscenity law advocates claim they would. If the
statements of porn producers are any indication, then it seems likely that
self-regulation would not occur. Porn producer Larry Flynt admits that
much of the self-regulation in the industry occurs, not as a result of moral
duty, but out of a fear of obscenity prosecutions. Mr. Flynt, a self-described
176. See, e.g., John Fee, Obscenity And The World Wide Web, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1691
(2007) (advocating that the local community standard remain intact in Internet obscenity
cases).
177. See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political
Viability: The Case of Internet Pornography, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 977, 1021-29 (2002).
178. See supra Part III.B.
179. Paul Cambria, a porn industry lawyer, created what has been called the "Cambria
list" consisting of sex acts he advises his clients to treat as taboo, among them, "[e]jaculation
on the face [and] urination." Transcript, Frontline: American Porn (PBS television broadcast
Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pom/etc/script.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012).
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purveyor of "plain vanilla sex," said that "[t]here are certain things you
don't do, not because you don't feel you have the right to do them, but
because they are indefensible in court.""' The questions then become, how
far would porn producers go without obscenity law; where would they draw
the line, if they would have a line at all; and, as porn producers try to outdo
one another, what impact will their one-upmanship have on society and on
the consumption of pornography? These are questions that, potentially,
have troubling answers.
2. A National Standard
Many scholars who favor abandoning obscenity law are willing to resort
to a national community standard as a compromise. The problem with
adopting a national standard, however, is the form that it will take. Only
two viable options 18 2 are present: (1) a minimal national standard or (2) an
average national standard."' The minimal national standard is, in essence, a
most permissive national standard-that is, jurors would be required to
determine whether the most permissive community in the nation would
find an Internet website obscene. For example, a jury in rural Kansas would
have to determine whether the average person in Los Angeles would find
Internet content obscene. The other option-an average national
standard-has been aptly described by one author as striking "a middle
ground somewhere between the values of West Hollywood, California
where [Larry] Flynt's Hustler Hollywood emporium is situated and Provo,
Utah where the wholesome-image Osmond family resides."'" The average
180. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Prosecuting Obscenity Cases: An Interview with
Mary Beth Buchanan, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 56, 80 n.57 (2010).
181. Among those advocating this position are Cenite, supra note 175, at 70-71
(proposing a minimal national standard if obscenity law is not to be abandoned in its
entirety); Julie Hilden, Should the Local Standard For Internet Speech Be National Or Local?,
FINDLAW (Mar. 2, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20100302.html (proposing a
minimal national standard if obscenity law is not to be abandoned).
182. A potential third option-a least tolerant community national standard-is not
viable because it "would provide the most puritan of communities with a heckler's Internet
veto affecting the rest of the Nation." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 590 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
183. Mark Cenite explained the concept of a national standard using three hypothetical
communities. On a 10-point scale, with 10 being the most tolerant, he stated that an average
national standard would be a community where anything above a "6" would be found
obscene, while a minimal national standard community would find material above an "8" to
be obscene. See Cenite, supra note 175, at 59-60.
184. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 52.
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national standard, however, presents potential problems of overbreadth.as
While adopting an average or minimal national standard has a certain
appeal, these options may not address the issues that the local community
standard poses."6
Advocates of the national standard believe that it would address
overbreadth and the chilling effects on speech that are attributed to the local
community standard. Essentially, advocates of the national standard argue
that such a standard would require juries to determine whether the national
community in the United States would find material to be obscene. Juries
would thus be required to do one of two things: (1) determine what the
average American thinks or (2) determine what the average, permissive
American thinks. Requiring a juror to do so is a task that may be impossible
and potentially de-fang obscenity law.
In this author's view, Justices Stevens correctly addressed this issue in his
dissenting opinion in Ashcroft v. ACLU.' He noted that the Court in Miller
believed that asking jurors to apply a national standard would be "an
exercise in futility" because "jurors instructed to apply a national, or adult,
standard will reach widely different conclusions throughout the country."'
Justices Stevens, therefore, was of the view that no matter what community
standard jurors are asked to apply-national or local-they will still reach
different conclusions as to whether material is obscene. In other words, a
national standard would create the illusion of a problem-solving standard.
A national standard, in reality, would still carry the same issues as a local
community standard.
First, a jury would still have the difficult task of determining what the
average or most permissive American thinks. A jury in rural Kansas may
have no idea how the residents of San Francisco would view material. In
fact, a Kansas jury may have a misperception of what kind of material
residents of San Francisco would permit, let alone what San Francisco
residents would find obscene. A jury is already burdened with the task of
determining what its own community considers obscene, let alone a
community that the jury has never-and may never-experience.
Second, a national standard may render obscenity law ineffective and
useless. If a jury must apply the community standard of a community other
185. See Cenite, supra note 175, at 60-61 (believing an average national standard to be
overbroad).
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 602-12.
188. Id. at 607 n.3.
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than its own and of which it is most likely unfamiliar, then the jury may
misjudge what the other community would find obscene. For example, if a
Kansas jury believes that it should apply the community standard of a
community with the permissiveness of San Francisco, it may believe that
San Francisco would permit material that, in actuality, the community of
San Francisco would find obscene. In essence, a national standard may
actually tip the balance in obscenity prosecutions in favor of content
providers and may make obscenity prosecutions difficult to obtain.
With a national standard, prosecutors would still know that a jury in
rural Kansas would reach a different conclusion than a jury in Los Angeles.
Counsel for content providers of adult materials would be aware of this fact,
and content providers would still engage in self-censorship.' The growing
reluctance among prosecutors to prosecute obscenity cases, combined with
changing attitudes regarding pornography, unfortunately points to an
eventual modification-if not outright abandonment-of obscenity law.
C. Why the Local Community Standard Should Remain Unchanged
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kilbride gave newfound legitimacy to
calls for Miller's local community standard to be abandoned in favor of a
national standard. As stated in Part IV.B.2, a national standard would not
be the answer its proponents believe it to be. More likely, a national
standard would result in juries in different communities still reaching
widely different verdicts, while at the same time giving a legal advantage to
producers of potentially obscene content. There are two other reasons a
national standard is not appropriate in the Internet Age. First, individual
communities should have the opportunity to determine what content each
finds obscene. Second, the Miller test has inherent safeguards that prevent
local communities from finding material obscene that should not be found
obscene.
1. The "Speech" They Fight To Protect
Anti-obscenity advocates believe that obscenity law prohibits speech that
should be allowed. They believe that obscenity law is from a bygone era
when sex was dirty and prudishness ruled the day. They view obscene
speech as essentially harmless speech; speech that society should tolerate;
speech that no reasonable society would want to prohibit. The question thus
becomes, what is the speech that they want to protect? Paul Little, a
189. Granted, content providers may engage in a lesser form of self-censorship than they
do now, but it would be difficult to measure this lesser form of self-censorship.
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convicted pornographer, stated that content that would get him in trouble
includes "pissing, fist f***ing, and pooping ... or gagging a girl until she
vomits . . . ."190 In a recent obscenity prosecution, Extreme Associates was
prosecuted for producing hardcore pornographic material that involved
simulated rapes and actual beatings."' In 2002, before Extreme Associates
was prosecuted, a PBS documentary entitled Frontline: American Porn
described a scene from one of Extreme Associates's films in graphic and
grotesque terms:
Before the scene is finished, Lizzie's friend, Veronica, will be
kicked and beaten. She will have .. . sex with each of these actors.
Then they will pretend to cut her throat and leave her for dead in
a pool of blood.19 2
It is this type of content that anti-obscenity advocates seek to protect. This
content is what they consider to be free speech. It may be that someday
society will believe that such speech is acceptable, perhaps even welcome,
but, until that day, segments of society must be given the opportunity to
decide for themselves if they want to allow such speech. Individual
communities must have the opportunity to say that some content goes too
far. The local community standard gives communities that opportunity.
2. The Miller Standard Safeguards Against Juries' Abuses of
Discretion
Beyond communities around the country being allowed the opportunity
to determine what material they find obscene, it is important to remember
that the Miller test has built-in safeguards against a jury's abuse of
discretion. In Jenkins v. Georgia,"3 the Court held that juries did not have
unbridled discretion in determining what was patently offensive,' and in
Smith v. United States,'"9 the Court held that obscenity convictions were
reviewable." 6 Thus, higher courts are allowed to review the decisions of
190. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 70.
191. Richards & Calvert, supra note 180, at 74-75 (2010) (discussing the content Extreme
Associates produced that caught the attention of federal prosecutors).
192. Transcript, Frontline: American Porn (PBS television broadcast Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/etc/script.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2012).
193. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
194. Id. at 160.
195. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
196. Id. at 305.
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juries to prevent prudish communities from reaching conclusions that are
unjust and inconsistent with the material at issue.
In addition, the third prong of the Miller test prevents otherwise valuable
material from being found obscene, a point expounded upon by Justice
Thomas in Ashcroft v. ACL U.117 The third prong of Miller asks the jury to
determine "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." 98 To understand how this prong
protects content providers, consider a hypothetical prudish community that
might find the Oscar-nominated 2008 film The Reader'99 obscene. This
hypothetical prudish community could have found that the film's explicit
depiction of a sexual relationship between a thirty-six-year old woman and
a fifteen-year old boy appealed to the "prurient interest" and was "patently
offensive" according to local community standards. Miller's third-prong,
however, would protect the film from being found obscene. The third-
prong provides a further safeguard because, unlike the "prurient interest"
and "patently offensive" prongs, the third prong is judged by a reasonable
person standard, not a local community standard.200 Additionally, it would
be practically impossible for a jury to conclude that a reasonable person
could find that an Oscar-nominated film like The Reader lacked "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."20 1 Thus, the Miller test has
inherent safeguards that prevent juries from exercising unbridled discretion
in finding material obscene, countering the possible prudishness of the local
community. Over the past decade, material like The Reader has not been
adjudged obscene. On the contrary, what has been found obscene is
material involving "pissing, fist f***ing, and pooping .. . or gagging a girl
until she vomits. ... "202
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet, as any new technology, has challenged traditional legal
standards. Miller's local community standard has caused many people in
the Internet Age to re-think the very idea of community. Furthermore, the
197. Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 577-79 (discussing how the Communication
Decency Act did not include any limiting terms resembling Miller's other two prongs
relating to prurient interest and serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
198. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
199. THE READER (The Weinstein Co. 2008).
200. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
201. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
202. See Calvert, supra note 156, at 70.
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Internet's national scope poses challenges to the local community standard
that differ in significant ways from other mediums of communication. The
question is whether the nature of the Internet requires a unique standard of
"community" distinct from the "local community" standard used for other
mediums. If the Internet requires a re-evaluation of Miller's contemporary
community standard, should it also require a re-evaluation of obscenity law
itself? Although applying the local community standard to the Internet may
result in forum shopping and chilling effects on free speech, the local
community standard may not be the problem that many of its detractors
claim.
Several options are available to address the issue of contemporary
community standards in the Internet Age. If the Supreme Court eventually
revisits the issue of contemporary community standards in the Internet
Age, it has a few options before it. As many have argued, the Supreme
Court could simply abandon the notion of obscenity entirely, at least with
regard to adult pornography. The Court could also choose to adopt some
form of a national standard in Internet obscenity cases. A national standard
could take the form of a minimal national standard or an average national
standard. Determining how the minimal or average national standard
should be measured, however, is a difficult matter and may provide only the
illusion of addressing the issues posed by a local community standard. In
reality, a national standard would be hard to measure and could result in
just as many variant results as the local community standard. Furthermore,
a national standard could give the legal advantage to content providers
because juries could have misconceptions about what the average person in
the nation would find obscene. Proponents of a national standard do not
ultimately see it as a permanent change but, instead, as a way to further
weaken obscenity law, with the ultimate goal being the abandonment of
obscenity law in its entirety. So far, only the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
national standard,2 03 but the Tenth Circuit,2 " along with the others, has yet
to see the need for a new standard.
All of these changes to the local community standard, however,
presuppose that the local community standard is in fact a problem. In this
author's view, the current local community standard is not a problem and
should remain intact. Prosecutors' lackluster desire to prosecute obscenity
cases, as well as changing social attitudes about pornography, are just two of
the various reasons that the local community standard may no longer pose
203. See supra Part III.C.1.
204. See supra Part III.C.2.
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the issues that it once did. In addition, the Miller standard provides
inherent safeguards against many of the issues attributed to the local
community standard. The local community standard has worked since
1973, and as the old adage says, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." In this day
and age, that is wise advice.
